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Participants recalled instances when they felt vicariously ashamed or guilty for another’s
wrongdoing and rated their appraisals of the event and resulting motivations. The study tested
aspects of social association that uniquely predict vicarious shame and guilt. Results suggest that
the experience of vicarious shame and vicarious guilt are distinguishable. Vicarious guilt was
predicted by one’s perceived interdependence with the wrongdoer (e.g. high interpersonal
interaction), an appraisal of control over the event, and a motivation to repair the other
person’s wrongdoing. Vicarious shame was predicted by the relevance of the event to a shared
social identity with the wrongdoer, an appraisal of self-image threat, and a motivation to
distance from the event. Implications for intergroup behavior and emotion are discussed.
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I envied other students back then [in postwar
Germany] who had dissociated themselves from
their parents and thus from the entire generation
of perpetrators, voyeurs, and the willfully blind,
accommodators and accepters, thereby overcoming
perhaps not their shame, but at least their suffering
because of the shame (p. 171). (Bernhard Schlink,
The Reader)
SHAME and guilt are powerful emotions of self-
condemnation that are thought to regulate
social interactions in situations where one has
violated a moral or social code (Baumeister,
Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1995; Eisenberg, 2000;
Keltner & Harker, 1998; Tangney & Fischer,
1995). Although we commonly think of shame
and guilt as feelings we experience as a result of
our own actions, the above quotation suggests
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that feelings of self-condemnation can some-
times result from acts committed by others.
Given that the emotional reactions that we have
to the wrongdoings of other group members
are relevant to both intragroup and intergroup
relations, it is surprising that no theoretical
framework has been developed of the
antecedents and consequences to distinguish
vicarious shame and guilt. The importance of
drawing such distinctions is critical if one
assumes that each emotion will have unique
behavioral consequences: as we will describe,
guilt may elicit more approach related behav-
iors designed to repair the situation, whereas
shame may elicit more withdrawing behaviors
designed to distance oneself from the situation.
Although the factors that distinguish vicarious
shame and guilt have not been empirically
investigated, some theorists have suggested that
these emotions can be experienced for another’s
misdeeds (Morris, 1987; Ortony, Clore, &
Collins, 1988; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Weiner,
1986). Intergroup researchers, meanwhile, have
examined guilt reactions to ingroup bias (e.g.
Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998;
Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; McGarty et al., in
press). Doosje et al. (1998), for example, showed
that under certain conditions, Dutch students
feel guilty for their country’s past history of
colonization in Indonesia, and perhaps as a con-
sequence, feel motivated to provide reparations
to the people of Indonesia. Furthermore,
research on the black sheep effect (e.g.
Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; Marques, Yzerbyt, &
Leyens, 1988) suggests that individuals
derogate group members who fail to comply
with the norms of the group. This past research
demonstrates that people have emotional and
behavioral reactions to the negative behaviors
of ingroup members. However, because none
of this research has examined both shame and
guilt, the conclusions yielded about the general
nature of vicarious emotion are limited. The
goal of the present paper was to test a model
that distinguishes between vicarious shame and
guilt felt for another’s wrongdoing. Rather than
focus on one particular type of group in one
type of context, our model is intended to
generalize to a variety of groups and situations. 
The nature of shame and guilt
Traditional emotion research has often assumed
that shame and guilt are more similar than
different (e.g. C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
However, more contemporary perspectives
argue that these two emotions differ in terms of
the motivations they evoke and their associated
appraisals (e.g. Hong & Chiu, 1992; Niedenthal,
Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; R. H. Smith,
Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002; Tangney, Miller,
Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Wicker, Payne, &
Morgan, 1983). For example, guilt predicts
approach-related responses meant to repair the
damage that was caused by the guilt-eliciting
event, and in fact several studies indicate that
guilt is particularly linked to a desire to confess,
apologize, or atone for one’s own wrongdoings
(e.g. Tangney et al., 1996; Wicker et al., 1983).
Shame, on the other hand, appears to be more
strongly linked to responses aimed at insulating
oneself from negative evaluation. Thus, rather
than facilitating reparative actions, feelings of
shame provoke a desire to hide, disappear, or
escape (Tangney, 1995; Wicker et al., 1983).
In addition to being distinguished by their
correspondent motivations, shame and guilt
also seem to differ with respect to how an indi-
vidual interprets a transgression with respect to
the self (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Feeling
guilty for one’s own wrongdoing is often associ-
ated with a focus on the specific controllable
behaviors that led up to the wrongful event,
whereas feeling ashamed involves a more global
emphasis on what that event seems to imply
about the dispositional qualities one possesses
(Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Wicker, et al., 1983).
For example, individuals who recall a guilt
experience are more likely to have the counter-
factual thought, ‘If only I had acted differently’,
whereas those who recall a shame experience
are more likely to think, ‘If only I were a
different type of person’ (Niedenthal et al.,
1994). Similarly, individuals perceive that they
have more control over situations that they
recall as guilt experiences as compared to
shame experiences (Wicker et al., 1983). Shame,
however, in comparison to guilt, involves a
greater feeling of self-consciousness and a fear
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(2)
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that one will be rejected by others (R. H. Smith
et al., 2002; Tangney et al., 1996; Wicker et al.,
1983).
Vicarious shame and guilt
Given the dominant conceptualization of shame
and guilt as self-conscious emotions, it is not
surprising that existing research has focused
almost exclusively on people’s experience of
these emotions after they have committed a
blameworthy action themselves. Indeed,
previous research suggests that shame and guilt
are unique among negative emotions in that
both typically involve high appraisals of
personal responsibility for a negative event
(Manstead & Tetlock, 1989; C. A. Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985). Our work is a departure from
this past research in that we suggest that actual
personal causality for a negative event is not
necessary to experience shame or guilt. We use
the terms vicarious shame and guilt to refer to
instances in which a person who is not the
proximal agent of a wrongdoing experiences
these emotions.
Our basic premise, that the emotional lives of
individuals are shaped by their association with
others, is a premise shared with many prior
researchers (e.g. Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 1999;
E. R. Smith, 1993). For example, social psy-
chologists have examined how people ‘pick up’
and experience the same emotion of those with
whom they are in close physical proximity (e.g.
Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Miller,
1987), as well as how people may experience
positive and negative feelings as a result of their
social identity or association with successful or
unsuccessful others (e.g. Cialdini & de Nicholas,
1989; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tesser, 1988) or
may experience vicarious dissonance from the
acts of others (Norton, Monin, Cooper, &
Hogg, 2003.) At a basic level, we agree with
others who have suggested that our social
groups are included as part of our self-identity
(e.g. E. R. Smith & Henry, 1996), and thus the
behaviors and attributes of other group
members have implications for the self. Much
of the existing theory and research on how
individuals are affected by their groups
presumes that the impact of the group on the
self will be greater to the extent that one’s
association to the group is strong. In fact, there
is some evidence that vicarious shame and guilt
reactions are stronger in China, a collectivist
culture, than in the United States, an indi-
vidualist culture (Stipek, 1998).
However, a consideration of association-
strength alone does not lead to predictions
about the degree to which shame versus guilt is
likely to occur. Given the appraisals that are
proposed to distinguish shame from guilt
experiences, we considered whether there were
distinct aspects of social association that might
be linked to appraisals of behavioral control
over the wrongdoer (thus evoking vicarious
guilt) versus appraisals that the event is a threat
to one’s image (thus evoking vicarious shame).
Drawing upon group theory and research (e.g.
Brewer, 2000; Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel,
1998; Krech & Crutchfield, 1948; Lewin, 1948;
Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994; Rabbie &
Horwitz, 1988; Tönnies, 1998; Wilder & Simon,
1998), we highlight two dimensions of social
associations that might play a role in activating
these appraisals in response to another’s wrong-
doing. One dimension is the extent to which
individuals are associated by a sense of shared
identity. The second dimension is the extent to
which individuals are associated by being inter-
personally interdependent with one another. Past
research, such as Prentice et al., 1994, assumed
that these two dimensions might refer to distinct
types of groups (which they contrasted as
common identity versus common bond groups).
In our analysis, we assume that some degree of
interpersonal interdependence and some
degree of shared identity are present in any
social association. Thus, we view these as dimen-
sions, rather than types, of social association.
The term ‘shared identity’ is used to refer to
the degree to which a social association is per-
ceived to reflect a deep and immutable aspect
of identity that is common to two or more
people and is often used by social perceivers to
make causal inferences about their behavior.
People may sometimes feel a sense of shared
identity with others based on only minimal
features (e.g. Tajfel, 1970). However, groups
Lickel et al. vicarious shame and guilt
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based on shared gender, ethnicity, religion, and
kinship often seem to involve high levels of
shared identity perhaps because these attributes
are often seen as essential features of the indi-
vidual (e.g. Allport, 1954; Haslam, Rothschild,
& Ernst, 2000; Hirschfeld, 1995; Rothbart &
Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron,
1997). Because perceptions of a shared social
identity are a source of self-identification and
esteem, people are invested in maintaining a
positive reputation of their social identities and
are loath to have negative stereotypes about
their groups confirmed (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
Distinct from the shared identity of a group,
‘interpersonal interdependence’ refers to the
degree to which individuals are perceived to
have high levels of social interaction, possess
joint goals, and have shared norms of behavior
(e.g. Gaertner & Shopler, 1998, Hinsz, Tindale,
& Vollrath, 1997; Lewin, 1948; Lickel et al.,
2000; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1988; Wilder & Simon,
1998). An important aspect of interdependent
associations is that the associated persons have
the opportunity for shared communication and
influence over one another’s thoughts and
behaviors. Examples of highly interdependent
associations include business partners, close
friends, and sports teammates. Thus, highly
interdependent associations involve close
contact and communication between indi-
viduals, although any other connection between
them might be arbitrary. Strong identity-based
associations involve stable aspects of perceived
similarity among individuals although those
individuals may or may not have highly inter-
dependent relationships with one another. 
We argue that these different dimensions of
association are important to understanding the
degree to which a person feels vicarious shame
or vicarious guilt because of another’s trans-
gression. When an individual engages in some
wrongful behavior, one’s perceptions of inter-
dependence with that person are hypothesized
to be associated with one’s appraisals of having
control over the occurrence of the event, which
in turn are associated with the degree of guilt
and reparative motivations. In contrast, the
degree to which the person’s behavior is seen as
relevant to a group identity or reputation
shared in common with the perpetrator should
relate to an appraisal that the event is a threat
to one’s own self-image, which in turn should
be associated with the degree of shame and dis-
tancing motivations. We should make clear
that, in some cases, there is a high level of both
interdependence with the wrongdoer and a
sense that the behavior reflects negatively on a
shared identity. In such cases, people may feel
both shame and guilt for the group member’s
actions. As an extreme example, we might
imagine that the parents of a high school
student who takes a gun to school and kills
several classmates might feel guilty because they
believe that they should have known about and
been able to prevent their child’s behavior,
whereas they might feel ashamed because they
fear that their own ‘flesh and blood’ is morally
flawed. However, though shame and guilt may
co-occur, we believe that even in these
instances, the emotions are separable.
The present study was designed to test the
hypotheses described above. The goal of this
study was to disentangle shame- and guilt-
related constructs by assessing people’s experi-
ences with multiple group memberships in
which there is likely to be some variation in the
perception of shared identity as well as inter-
dependence. In particular, we selected three
group memberships that, based on past
research (e.g. Haslam et al., 2000; Lickel et al.,
2000), we expected would differ in their degree
of interdependence and shared identity.
Specifically, family and friendship groups should
be fairly high in interdependence compared to
ethnic groups. Furthermore, although all three
groups might involve some degree of shared
identity, we thought that a sense of shared
identity (particularly, an essentialized identity)
was more typical of family and ethnic associ-
ations than of friendship groups. Participants
recalled a time when a member of each of these
groups did something that made them (the
participants) feel ashamed or guilty. We
examined the degree to which variation in their
ratings of interdependence and the relevance
of the event to a shared identity predicted their
appraisals of the event, their emotional reac-
tions, and their behavioral motivations.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(2)
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Methods
Participants and procedures
Participants were 187 undergraduate students
who participated for course credit. Partici-
pants were asked to recall and make ratings of
three distinct events in which they felt
ashamed or guilty for the actions of a family
member, a friend, and a person who they do
not know well but who happened to share
their ethnicity (order was counterbalanced
across participants). Participants were
instructed to spend five minutes writing about
the event and to describe what happened, who
did what, and how the event made them feel.
Of the 187 participants, 22 were excluded
because one or more of the three events
recalled was coded as being self-caused, rather
than caused by someone else. Thus, responses
of 165 participants were analyzed. After each
event, participants completed ratings of their
emotions, motivations, appraisals, and associ-
ation related variables. 
Measures
Shame and guilt ratings Participants’ emotional
reactions to each event were assessed with 23
emotion words (rated from 1 = Not at all, 9 =
Very intensely). Factor analyses of these emotions
utilizing maximum likelihood estimation with
varimax rotation yielded distinct clusters of
shame and guilt emotions that were consistent
across each of the target groups (family, friend,
ethnicity). On the basis of these factor analyses,
we created separate composites of guilt items
(guilty, regret, remorse) and shame items
(ashamed, embarrassed, disgraced, and humili-
ated) for each event. The guilt composite ( =
.76 for family,  = .76 for friend,  = .76 for
ethnic group) and the shame composite ( =
.82 for family,  = .78 for friend,  = .82 for
ethnic group) were reliable for all three events.
Other emotions were included as fillers; results
for these emotions can be obtained from the
first author. 
Appraisals and motivations Behavioral control
was assessed with four items: ‘I could have pre-
vented this event from occurring’, ‘I felt I
should have done something to prevent the
event’, ‘I’m afraid I may have encouraged the
person to do what they did by something I did
or said’, and ‘I felt responsible for the event
occurring’. The measure of image threat was
assessed with three items ‘I felt that the event
reflected poorly on me’, ‘I felt that people
would make judgments about the type of
person I am based on the event’, ‘I was afraid
that this person’s behavior would be viewed as
indicating something about the person I am’.
Distancing was assessed with three items, ‘I
wanted to be completely unassociated with the
person who caused the event’, ‘I felt like I
wanted to disappear from the situation’, and
‘At the time, I remember thinking that I didn’t
want to be associated in any way with the person
who caused the event’. Reparative motivations
were assessed four items, ‘I tried to do some-
thing after the event to make it better’, ‘I felt I
should do something after the event to make it
better’, ‘I had a lot of ability to repair the
impact of the event after it occurred’, and ‘I felt
I should apologize for what happened’. All
items were rated from 1 (strongly disagree) – 9
(strongly agree).
A factor analysis using maximum likelihood
estimation with varimax rotation yielded a four-
factor solution for each of the groups (family,
friend, ethnic group) indicating that items
designed to assess behavioral control, image
threat, event repair, and distancing were
distinct constructs. With some variation, these
measures were fairly reliable across target
group: behavioral control ( = .62 for family, 
= .57 for friend,  = .62 for ethnic group);
image threat ( = .82 for family,  = .81 for
friend,  = .83 for ethnic group); reparations (
= .78 for family,  = .83 for friend,  = .78 for
ethnicity); and distancing ( = .87 for family, 
= .84 for friend,  = .73 for ethnicity).
Association related variables Interdependence
and shared identity questions were examined
via factor analyses with maximum likelihood
estimation and varimax rotation. For all three
events, items designed to assess interdepen-
dence and shared identity fell on two distinct
factors. Perceived interdependence was assessed
Lickel et al. vicarious shame and guilt
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with three questions rated on a 9-point scale (
= .68 for family,  = .78 for friend,  = .86 for
ethnicity): ‘To what degree is the person who
caused the event someone that you interact
with’, ‘To what degree do you have influence or
control over this person and his/her behavior’,
and ‘How well do you know the person who
caused the event?’ Identity relevance was assessed
by two items ‘I felt like this person’s behavior
was confirming negative conceptions that other
people might have about the reputation of my
family [or friendship group, or ethnic group]’,
and ‘Was the event at all related to people’s
negative beliefs or preconceptions about the
reputation of your family [or friendship group,
or ethnic group]?’ (rated on a 9-point scale, 1
= no, 9 = yes) that were fairly reliable ( = .66
for family;  = .52 for friends;  = .60 for
ethnicity). 
Results
Descriptive statistics on variables
Table 1 is a summary of mean ratings for each
of the three target groups and results of one-
way repeated analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
testing differences among the three groups.
These descriptive statistics revealed significant
variation among ratings for the three different
groups. For example, events involving either
family or friends had higher ratings of inter-
dependence, appraisals of control, feelings of
guilt, and a desire to make repairs compared to
events involving an ethnic ingroup member.
Events involving an ethnic ingroup member, in
contrast, were rated as highly relevant to the
group identity and evoked a desire to distance
oneself from the situation. 
Hierarchical linear modeling analyses
Although the mean differences described
above are informative, our more specific inten-
tion was that by asking participants to rate three
different groups, we would have created
variance in ratings of interdependence and the
potential for the event to be relevant to a
shared identity that should be predictive of
variance in their ratings of other shame and
guilt related constructs in our model. However,
because each participant rated three different
groups, their ratings were not independent of
one another (i.e. ratings of group were nested
within subject). To account for the lack of inde-
pendence in participants’ ratings, we used hier-
archical linear modeling (HLM; Raudenbush,
Bryk, & Congdon, 2000) to test the hypothe-
sized relationships among the variables in the
model nested at the within-subject level. In the
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(2)
150
Table 1. Mean ratings in main study variables for each of the three target groups
Target group
Family Friend Ethnicity One-way ANOVA
Association variables
Identity relevance 5.08a 4.87a 6.39b F(2, 328) = 28.76, p < .001
Interdependence 6.48a 6.10a 2.19b F(2, 328) = 311.27, p < .001
Emotion ratings
Shame 6.35a 5.71b 5.66b F(2, 328) = 4.21, p < .05
Guilt 3.94a 3.99a 3.54b F(2, 328) = 10.87, p < .001
Appraisal ratings
Image Threat 5.56a 5.63a 5.07b F(2, 328) = 4.23, p < .05
Control 3.17b 3.73a 2.21c F(2, 328) = 42.57, p < .001
Motivation ratings
Distancing 5.49a 5.63a, b 6.14b F(2, 328) = 4.18, p < .05
Repair 4.64a 4.75a 3.59b F(2, 328) = 18.82, p < .01
Notes : Means within row not sharing the same subscript differ significantly (p < .05). Response scales ranged
from 1 to 9.
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following analyses, each variable was standard-
ized (z-scored) and entered (person centered)
as predictor or outcome variables in a hierar-
chical maximum likelihood estimation pro-
cedure. For these analyses, models were
specified with a random error term for predic-
tor variables when analysis of variance com-
ponents revealed significant variability. The
resulting standardized scores are comparable to
standardized regression coefficients in least-
squares regression techniques. Relationships
from this series of analyses are summarized in
Figure 1.
Appraisal, emotion, and motivation results
Initial analyses demonstrated that ratings of
shame and guilt were somewhat related ( = .37,
p < .001); as were appraisals of behavioral
control and image threat ( = .16, p < .05);
while distancing and repair motivations were
not ( = .06, p > .10). Next, models were tested
in which behavioral control and image threat
appraisals were entered simultaneously as pre-
dictors first of shame, then of guilt. These
analyses supported our predictions that image
threat ( = .39, p < .001), rather than behavioral
control ( = .04, p > .10), predicts shame,
Lickel et al. vicarious shame and guilt
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Figure 1. Summary of a series of hierarchical linear modeling analyses testing the relationships among
variables (Note: Hypothesized relationships are indicated by solid lines. The implied model was not tested in
its entirety simultaneously and is presented for its heuristic value of concisely summarizing relevant results).
Relevance to
Shared Identity
.32***
.39***
.31***
.20***
.31***
.50***
.36***
–.20***
r = .34***
Behavior Control Appraisal
.43***
.33***
.12***Perceived
Interdependence Vicarious Guilt
Motive to Repair
Image Threat Appraisal
Vicarious Shame
Motive to Distance
r = .16*
.08*
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whereas behavioral control ( = .31, p < 001),
but not image threat ( = .10, p > .10), predicts
guilt. In a second pair of analyses, shame and
guilt were entered simultaneously as predictors
first of distancing, then of repairs. Consistent
with past work on self-caused shame and guilt,
distancing was uniquely predicted by shame
( = .50, p < .001), but not guilt ( = –.01,
p > .10). Repair was predicted by guilt ( = .36,
p < .001), but only weakly by shame ( = .11,
p = .07) (a follow-up contrast of the coefficients
in HLM indicates that the coefficients for guilt
and shame were significantly different, p < .05.)
Taken together, these results support the
notion that there are two distinct profiles of
appraisal, emotion, and motivation that distin-
guish experiences of vicarious shame from
experiences of vicarious guilt.
Social association variables as predictors of
shame and guilt related constructs We next
examined the degree to which interpersonal
interdependence and the relevance of the
event to social identity uniquely predicted these
two emotion profiles. Importantly, an initial
analysis showed that perceptions of identity
relevance and interdependence were orth-
ogonal ( = –.03, p > .10). The first set of
analyses, in which the two association variables
were entered as predictors of appraisals, con-
firmed that identity relevance was a significant
predictor of image threat ( = .32, p < .001), but
interdependence was not ( = .05, p > .10).
Furthermore, interdependence predicted
behavioral control ( = .43, p < .001), but
identity relevance did not ( = .05, p > .10).
Separate HLM analyses revealed that identity
relevance was a stronger predictor of shame
( = .31, p < .001, than was interdependence
( = .08, p < .05) (a follow-up contrast of the
coefficients in HLM indicates that the co-
efficients for identity relevance and interdepen-
dence were significantly different, p = .052). In
contrast, interdependence was a significant pre-
dictor of guilt ( = .12, p < .001), but identity
relevance was not ( = –.05, p > .10). Finally, a
third set of analyses revealed that identity
relevance had a positive relationship to distanc-
ing ( = .20, p < .001), whereas interdependence
had a negative relationship to distancing ( =
–20, p < .001). Interdependence was, as hypoth-
esized, a predictor of repairs ( = .33, p < .001),
but identity relevance was not ( = .04, p > .10).
To summarize, the preceding analyses each
examined the relationship of people’s percep-
tions of the identity relevance of the event and
their interdependence to the wrongdoer to
each of the other variables in our framework.
Consistent with our model, ratings of identity
relevance (and not interdependence) positively
predicted shame related constructs, whereas
ratings of interdependence (and not identity
relevance) positively predicted guilt related
constructs.
Discussion
The results of this study provide support for our
hypothesis that vicarious shame and guilt are
distinct emotional reactions predicted by
unique appraisals of events and by different
aspects of one’s association to a wrongdoer.
People felt guilty for another’s wrongdoing to
the extent that they had a highly interdepen-
dent association with that person and felt that
they should have been able to control his or her
actions. In contrast, people felt ashamed for
another’s wrongdoing to the extent that they
felt that the person’s behavior was relevant to a
social identity that they shared in common with
the wrongdoer and appraised the other
person’s behavior as a negative reflection on
themselves. In turn, each emotion predicted a
unique behavioral response. Whereas guilt pre-
dicted a desire to make amends for another’s
wrongdoing, shame predicted a desire to
distance oneself from the situation and the
wrongdoer. Importantly, one’s interpersonal
bonds with a wrongdoer had little or no
relation to how ashamed one felt for that
person’s behavior, and the degree to which the
person’s actions tarnished the group’s repu-
tation had little or no relation to feelings of
guilt.
The research presented here advances our
current understanding of shame and guilt as
self-conscious emotions as well as our under-
standing of appraisals important in regulating
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intragroup and intergroup interactions. First,
with respect to emotion theory, our studies rep-
resent the first systematic investigation of the
appraisals that underlie why someone might
feel ashamed versus guilty for the actions of
others. Although other studies have explored
how people respond to wrongs committed by
fellow ingroup members (e.g. Doosje et al.,
1998; McGarty et al., in press), our research is
unique in its intent to map the terrain of
vicarious shame and guilt in a way that is not
tied to specific social associations or types of
wrongdoing. Furthermore, our framework
provides a platform for future research by
describing vicarious shame and guilt at four
levels of analyses: aspects of social association,
self-related appraisals, emotional experience,
and motivation. 
It is also worth noting that this study rep-
resents some of the strongest evidence to date
that shame and guilt are associated with distinct
motivations. For example, even in ground-
breaking work on the distinctions between
these emotions, Tangney et al. (1996) did not
find clear evidence that guilt included a greater
desire to make amends for a personal wrong-
doing than did shame. One possible reason for
this lack of clarity is that past work has often
measured distancing and repair as opposite
ends of a single dimension, rather than as
orthogonal motivations. Our data suggest that
these may be very different motivations and
should be studied independently. 
In addition to advances in emotion research,
the model presented here may also advance our
understanding of the relationship of the self to
the group. Most research on group behavior
and perception has developed around one of
two assumptions about the nature of groups.
One set of theories has been developed for
groups that are social categories defined largely
by a shared characteristic or group label (e.g.
Haslam et al., 2000; Park & Judd, 1990; Turner,
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). A
second set of theories has been developed for
groups that are close interacting groups that
are characterized as having high degrees of
communication, cooperation, and mutual
influence (Cartwright & Zander, 1960; E. R.
Smith, Murphy, & Coats, 1999; Levine &
Moreland, 1998). In our present work, we have
conceptualized shared identity and interdepen-
dence as separate dimensions of social associ-
ation rather than as mutually exclusive types of
groups. Furthermore, the results show that
articulating these dimensions of social associ-
ation can have important implications for how
members of groups perceive and respond to
the behavior of their fellow ingroup members.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to
explicitly compare how these two dimensions of
association predict intragroup and intergroup
processes (but see Hamilton et al., 1998; Hogg
& Moreland, 1993; Sedikides, Schopler, &
Insko, 1998, for a discussion of the advantages
of inclusive frameworks for studying groups).
Limitations and future directions 
The study we presented relied on a narrative
recall approach to studying emotion. The
narrative approach has the benefit of assessing
a wide variety of events that are personally
meaningful to participants. Even so, this retro-
spective nature of this approach does limit
some of the conclusions we can draw about
causation and does not allow us to pull apart the
temporal sequencing of these component pro-
cesses. For this reason, we did not feel we could
adequately test mediational hypotheses in these
cross-sectional studies. Again experimental
studies will be needed to test mediational
claims and examine these emotions on-line.
In addition, we have constrained our analysis
to events for which individuals have felt a fairly
strong and memorable emotional reaction to
another’s behavior. Because of this, we are
somewhat limited in drawing conclusions
about what factors are necessary to experience
an emotional reaction in the first place. We
can speculate, however, that certain other
appraisals are required to activate a vicarious
shame or vicarious guilt experience. The first
step, we believe, is that the individual assigns
responsibility for the negative event to another
individual with whom they are somehow associ-
ated. Second, the individual must perceive the
event to be negative or discrepant with goals
that he or she holds. Other factors, such as the
Lickel et al. vicarious shame and guilt
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intentionality of the act may also influence
these initial appraisals and should be investi-
gated in future work.
We believe that one important issue for
future work will be to integrate what is known
from the literature on people’s affective reac-
tions to the more global and historical wrong-
doings (such as a history of colonialization) of
their groups (e.g. Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer et al.,
2003; McGarty et al., in press—for a recent
edited volume on the topic see Branscombe &
Doojse, 2004) with other work on people’s
shame and guilt reaction to specific acts of
ingroup members (e.g. Johns, Schmader, &
Lickel, in press; Schmader & Lickel, in press).
Clearly, our current framework is directed pri-
marily toward explaining how people react to
specific acts by other members of their group.
Future work should compare how people make
sense of specific acts (such as a White American
observing another White American act in a
racist way) with more global and historical
events (such as the institutionalized history of
racism in America). Nonetheless, we agree with
the arguments of Iyer et al. (2003) that research
on group-based guilt will be advanced most pro-
ductively when researchers attempt to identify
the importance of distinctions between guilt
and other emotions, such as sympathy, shame,
and anger. We believe that the framework we
present in this paper is a useful step in this
direction. 
In addition to its applicability to situations
that are typically the focus of social identity and
intergroup relations research, we are also inter-
ested in the application of our framework to
other settings such as workplace or intimacy
groups. For example, parents clearly may be
blamed for the actions of their children (e.g.
Lickel, Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003), but sur-
prisingly little research has examined parents’
emotional reactions to their children’s trans-
gressions. Likewise, in romantic relationships,
feelings of vicarious shame and guilt for one’s
partner may play a role in predicting relation-
ship satisfaction and duration. We believe that
the findings reported here represent a starting
point for these investigations.
In conclusion, shame and guilt are intriguing
emotions that have only recently come under
focused empirical inquiry. Likewise, investi-
gations of how the self is shaped through group
memberships have recently flourished.
However, much of the recent work that has
been done on how groups affect the self has
focused on how groups impact more on cogni-
tive processes of the self (e.g. Sedikides et al.,
1998; E. R. Smith & Henry, 1996). Less work
has examined the impact of groups on the
specific emotions that people experience. It is
our hope that the framework developed here
will encourage additional research that inte-
grates theory on emotion and group processes.
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